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Abstract. We show that a special case of the Feferman-Vaught composition theorem
gives rise to a natural notion of automata for finite words over an infinite alphabet, with
good closure and decidability properties, as well as several logical characterizations. We
also consider a slight extension of the Feferman-Vaught formalism which allows to express
more relations between component values (such as equality), and prove related decidability
results. From this result we get new classes of decidable logics for words over an infinite
alphabet.
Introduction
The problem of finding suitable notions of automata for words over an infinite alphabet
has been adressed in several papers [1, 16, 3, 5, 10, 24]. The motivations are e.g. mod-
elization of temporized systems, distributed systems, or manipulation of semi-structured
data. A common goal is to find a simple and expressive model which preserves as much
as possible the good properties of the classical model. Kaminski and Francez [16] intro-
duce finite-memory automata: these are finite automata equipped with a finite number of
registers which allow to store symbols during the run, and compare them with the current
symbol. The paper [5] extends somehow this idea by allowing transitions which involve
an equivalence relation of finite index defined on the set of (vector) values of the registers.
The paper [24] continues the study of finite-memory automata, and also introduce pebble
automata, which are automata equipped with a finite set of pebbles whose use is restricted
by a stack discipline. The automaton can test equality by comparing the pebbled symbols.
The work [3] addresses decidability issues for some fragment of first-order logic which allows
to express properties of words over an infinite alphabet, and introduces a related notion of
automaton. More recently, Choffrut and Grigorieff [10] define automata whose transitions
are expressed as first-order formulas (see below). Let us also mention the work [12] which
studies variants of constraint LTL over infinite domains.
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The aim of this paper is to show that a special case of the Feferman-Vaught composition
theorem gives rise to a natural notion of automata for finite words over an infinite alphabet,
with good closure and decidability properties, as well as several logical characterizations.
Building on Mostowski’s work [23], Feferman and Vaught consider in [14] several kinds
of products of logical structures, and prove that the first-order (shortly: FO) theory of a
(generalized) product of structures reduces to the FO theory of the factor structures and the
monadic second-order (shortly: MSO) theory of the index structure. We refer the interested
reader to the survey papers [21, 32] which present several applications of these results, as
well as extensions of the technique; for recent related results see e.g. [26, 27, 34].
An interesting special case of the Feferman-Vaught (shortly: FV) theorem is when one
considers the generalized weak power of a single structure M, and the index structure is
(ω;<). In this case the domain of the resulting structure roughly consists in the set of
finite words over the domain of M (seen as an alphabet), and the definable relations can
be characterized in terms of automata thanks to Bu¨chi-Elgot-Trakhtenbrot results on the
equivalence between definability in the MSO theory of (ω;<) and automata. The automata
model and related logics we consider can be seen as direct reformulations of this special
case. Note that the connection between automata and products of structures was already
explored in [2], where it is shown that automatic structures are closed under finite products.
For the sake of readability, in the paper we first introduce the automata model and prove
some of its properties, and then put in evidence the connection with the Feferman-Vaught
construction.
In Section 2 we define the automata model. Given a structure M with domain Σ
(finite or not), we define M-automata as multitape synchronous finite automata which
read finite words over Σ, and whose transitions are labelled by first-order formulas in the
language of M. We show that the class of relations recognizable by such automata (which
are called M-recognizable relations) are closed under boolean and rational operations, as
well as projection, and that the emptiness problem is decidable whenever the FO theory
of M is. These results are straightforward generalizations of the classical case of a finite
alphabet.
In Section 3 we provide two logical characterizations of M-recognizable languages. The
first one uses MSO logic and is an easy adaptation of Bu¨chi’s classical result [7]. For the
second one, we first introduce the notion of M-automatic structures which extends the
notion of automatic structures, and prove some basic related results. Then we extend the
Eilenberg-Elgot-Shepherdson FO formalism [13] for synchronous relations over words to the
case of M-recognizable relations. This result, and actually the automaton model itself, are
a natural generalization of Choffrut and Grigorieff results mentioned above [10].
Several results of Section 2 and 3 are rather easy generalizations or reformulations of
well-known results; therefore many proofs in these sections are only sketched.
In Section 4 we recall useful notions and results about products and powers of structures,
then show the close relationship between M-recognizability and definability in generalized
weak powers. This allows to revisit all previous results in the light of the Feferman-Vaught
framework.
Section 5 presents some applications. We first apply the previous ideas to improve
a recent result by Kuske and Lohrey [19] related to the monadic chain logic of iteration
structures; this application was brought to our attention by Wolfgang Thomas. In the
second part of the section, we provide a logical characterization of M-recognizable relations
for the special case where M = (ω; +), in terms of ordinal theories.
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In terms of expressive power, M-automata are incomparable with automata and logics
considered in [3, 16, 24], since on one hand they allow to express FO constraints, but on
the other hand they cannot test whether two positions in a word carry the same symbol
(for instance, the language {aa | a ∈ Σ} is not M-recognizable whenever Σ is infinite, see
Example 2.5). As shown e.g. in [3, 24] these kinds of tests have to be limited if one wants
to keep good decidability properties. In Section 6 we propose a slight extension of the
Feferman-Vaught formalism which allows to test whether an n−tuple s1, . . . , sn of symbols
appearing in distinct positions in a word w, satisfies a formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) in M. We
isolate a syntactic fragment of this logic, which we denote by MSO+R(L), for which the
satisfiability problem (or in other words, the emptiness problem for related languages) still
reduces to the decidability of the FO theory of M.
1. Definitions and notations
In the sequel we deal with finite words over some alphabet, finite or not. Given an
alphabet Σ (finite or not) we denote by Σ∗ (respectively Σω) the set of finite words (respec-
tively ω−words) over Σ. The empty word is denoted by ε, and the length of a finite word
w by |w|. Given a word w ∈ Σ∗ with length n, we denote by w[i] the i−th symbol of w
(starting from i = 0). We shall say that the position i carries w[i].
We consider several logical formalisms. By FO we mean first-order logic with equality.
We shall also consider Monadic Second-Order Logic (shortly: MSO). We denote by FO(M)
(respectively MSO(M)) the first-order (respectively monadic second-order) theory of the
structure M. We consider only relational structures. Given a language L and a L-structure
M, for every relational symbol R of L we denote by RM the interpretation of R in M.
However, we will often confuse logical symbols with their interpretation. Moreover we will
use freely abbreviations such as ∃x ∈ X ϕ.
We shall deal with multitape synchronous automata. As usual, given n finite words
(w1, . . . , wn) over Σ, we introduce a padding symbol #, and we complete (if necessary) each
wi with a sufficient number of #’s in order to have words of the same length. Doing this,
we obtain n words over Σ ∪ {#} with the same length, which can be seen as a single word
over the alphabet (Σ ∪ {#})n (i.e. the alphabet of n−tuples of elements of Σ ∪ {#}). This
word will be denoted by 〈w1, . . . , wn〉.
Consider a relational language L and a L-structureM with domain Σ. Since we have to
deal with the symbol # we shall associate to M the structure M# in the extended language
L# = L ∪ {P#}, such that:
• the domain of M# is Σ ∪ {#};
• for every relational symbol R of L, we have RM# = RM;
• P#(x) holds in M# if and only if x = #.
2. Definition and properties of M-automata
In this section we introduce the notion of M-automata and M-recognizable relations,
and prove some basic results.
Let Σ denote an alphabet, finite or not, and let M denote an L−structure with domain
Σ. An M-automaton is a finite n−tape synchronous non-deterministic automaton which
reads finite words over Σ. Transition rules are triplets of the form (q, ϕ, q′), where q, q′ are
states of the automaton, and ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) is a first-order formula in the language L# of
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M#. The transition (q, ϕ, q
′) can be executed if the n−tuple of current symbols read by
the n heads satisfies ϕ in M#.
Definition 2.1. Let Σ be an alphabet and let M denote an L−structure with domain Σ.
An M-automaton is defined as a 7−tuple A = (Q,n,Σ,M, E, I, T ) where
• Q is a finite set (of states);
• n ≥ 1 is the number of tapes;
• E ⊆ Q×Fn ×Q is the set of transitions, where Fn denotes the set of L#-formulas with
n free variables;
• I ⊆ Q is the set of initial states;
• T ⊆ Q is the set of terminal states.
Given an n−tuple w = (w1, . . . , wn) of words over Σ, a path γ in A labeled by 〈w〉 is a
sequence of states γ = (q0, . . . , qm), such that m = |〈w〉|, q0 ∈ I, and for every i < m there
exists a L#-formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) such that (qi, ϕ, qi+1) ∈ E and
M# |= ϕ(π1(〈w〉)[i], . . . , πn(〈w〉)[i])
where πj(〈w〉) denotes the j−th component of 〈w〉. The path γ is successful if qm ∈ T . We
say that w is accepted by A if 〈w〉 is the label of some successful path. We denote by L(A)
the set of words w ∈ (Σ∗)n which are accepted by A.
Definition 2.2. Let n ≥ 1. A relation X ⊆ (Σ∗)n is said to be M-recognizable if and only
if there exists an M-automaton A with n tapes such that X = L(A).
Example 2.3. Let M = (ω; +) where + denotes the graph of addition. The following
relations are M-recognizable:
(1) the set of words over ω (seen as as an infinite alphabet) of the form (1, 0, ..., 0) (we
allow the case where there is no 0). Consider indeed the M-automaton with two
states q0, q1, where q0 is initial and q1 is terminal, and whose set of transitions is
{(q0, ϕ1, q1), (q1, ϕ0, q1)} where ϕ0(x) is the formula x+x = x, and ϕ1(x) expresses that
x = 1. The automaton is pictured in Figure 1.
q0 q1
ϕ1
ϕ0
Figure 1: A simple M-automaton
(2) the set of words over ω whose symbols are alternatively even and odd. Consider indeed
the M-automaton with two states q0, q1, where q0, q1 both are initial and terminal
states, and whose set of transitions is {(q0, ϕe, q1), (q1, ϕo, q0)} where ϕe(x) is the formula
∃z z + z = x, and ϕo(x) = ¬ϕe(x).
(3) the relation L ⊆ ω∗ × ω∗ × ω∗ defined by (u, v, w) ∈ L if and only if u, v, w have the
same length, and moreover for every i the i−th symbol of w equals the sum of the
corresponding symbols of u and v. Consider indeed the M-automaton with a single
state q (which is initial and terminal) and a single transition (q, ϕ, q) where ϕ(x, y, z)
is the formula x+ y = z. Observe that if u, v and w do not have the same length then
the last letter of 〈u, v, w〉, say (um, vm, wm), has at least one component which is equal
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to #, which by the very definition of M# implies M# 6|= ϕ(um, vm, wm), which implies
in turn that there is no (successful) run of A labelled by 〈u, v, w〉.
Example 2.4. Let M = (Σ; (Pa)a∈Σ), where Pa(x) holds if and only if x = a. One can
show that if Σ is finite then M-recognizable relations coincide with synchronous relations
(as defined in [13]).
Example 2.5. For every L-structure M = (Σ; ...) such that Σ is infinite, the language
X = {aa | a ∈ Σ} is notM-recognizable. Indeed assume for a contradiction that there exists
some M-automaton A = (Q,n,Σ,M, E, I, T ) which accepts X. Since X is infinite and E is
finite, there exists an infinite subset of X whose elements admit a common successful path.
More precisely, there exist two transitions (q0, ϕ1, q1), (q1, ϕ2, q2) ∈ E such that q0 ∈ I,
q2 ∈ T , and infinitely many elements a ∈ Σ satisfy M# |= ϕ1(a) and M# |= ϕ2(a). Thus
there exist at least two distinct elements a1 6= a2 such thatM# |= ϕ1(a1) andM# |= ϕ2(a2),
which implies that a1a2 is accepted by A, and this leads to a contradiction.
The closure properties of synchronous relations still hold for M-recognizable relations.
Proposition 2.6. The class of M-recognizable relations is closed under
(1) boolean operations;
(2) cylindrification;
(3) projection.
Proof. (sketch) (1) the closure under union is a straightforward adaptation of the classical
construction for non-deterministic automata. Let us outline the proof for the closure under
complementation. Assume that the relation R ⊆ (Σ∗)n is recognized by the M-automaton
A. Let ϕ1, . . . , ϕm denote the formulas which appear in the transitions of A. Consider, for
every subset J ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, the formula ψJ :
∧
i∈J ϕi ∧
∧
i 6∈J ¬ϕi. The M-automaton A
′
which is defined from A by replacing every transition (q, ϕi, q
′) ∈ E with all transitions of
the form (q, ψJ , q
′) where i ∈ J , also recognizes R. Moreover A′ can be seen as a classical
non-deterministic automaton over the finite “alphabet” of formulas ψJ , and thus it can
be determinized, i.e. transformed into an equivalent M-automaton A′′ whose transitions
involve the formulas ψJ , and such that for every state q and every formula ψJ there exists
a single transition of A′′ the form (q, ψJ , q
′). Now one can use the usual construction for
complementation of deterministic automata, i.e. turn non-terminal states to terminal states
and conversely, and get an M-automaton which recognizes (Σ∗)n \R.
(2) is straightforward.
For (3), in order to recognize the projection of R ⊆ (Σ∗)n, say over the n − 1 first
components, it suffices to replace, in the M-automaton which recognizes R, all transi-
tions (q, ϕ(x1, . . . , xn), q
′) with transitions (q,∃xnϕ(x1, . . . , xn), q
′).
Regarding the emptiness problem for M-recognizable languages, the main difference
with the classical case is that in an M-automaton A there can exist transitions (q, ϕ, q′) ∈
E such that no n−tuple of elements of M# satisfies ϕ; such transitions will never be
executed by A. Thus one has to remove such transitions from E in order to apply the usual
reachability algorithm for the emptiness problem; this can be done effectively if and only if
FO(M#) is decidable. Since FO(M#) and FO(M) are reducible to each other, we get the
following result.
Proposition 2.7. The decidability of the emptiness problem for M-recognizable languages
is equivalent to the decidability of FO(M).
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3. Logic and M-automata
There exist three important logical formalisms which capture automata:
• Bu¨chi-Elgot-Trakhtenbrot MSO logic (see [7]), i.e. the weak monadic second order theory
of (ω,<);
• the Eilenberg-Elgot-Shepherdson (shortly: EES) formalism [13], i.e. the FO theory of
S = (Σ∗;EqLength,, {La}a∈Σ) where
- EqLength(x, y) holds if and only if x and y have the same length
- x  y holds if and only if x is a prefix of y
- La(x) holds if and only if a is the last letter of x.
• the so-called Bu¨chi Arithmetic of base k, i.e. the FO theory of the structure (ω; +, Vk)
where Vk(x) denotes the greatest power of k which divides x, see [6].
In this section we extend the two first formalisms to the case of words over any alphabet
(finite or not). In order to extend the EES formalism, we introduce the notion of M-
automatic structure, which generalizes the one of automatic structures.
In Section 5.2 we will prove that for M = (ω; +), the class of M-recognizable relations
corresponds to the class of relations definable in the structure (ωω; +). The latter structure
can therefore be seen as “Bu¨chi Arithmetic of base ω”.
3.1. Monadic Second-Order Logic.
Bu¨chi, Elgot and Trakhtenbrot prove that languages of words definable by MSO logic
coincide with regular languages (see [33]). As an example if Σ = {a, b} then one can
characterize the set of words w ∈ aa∗b∗ in MSO logic with the formula
∃x(Qa(x) ∧ ∀y((x < y → Qb(y)) ∧ (y < x→ Qa(y))))
where the (first-order) variables x, y are interpreted as positions in the word, < denotes the
natural ordering of positions, and Qs(y) holds if and only if the y−th position in the word
carries the symbol s. The unary predicates Qa and Qb express properties related to elements
of Σ. These properties are actually first-order definable in the structure M = (Σ;Pa, Pb).
We shall extend this formalism by considering any structure M with domain Σ (finite or
not) and adding to the MSO formalism unary predicates αF (x) which express that the
symbol at position x satisfies the formula F in M.
More formally, let M = (Σ; ...) be an L-structure. We associate to every L#-formula
F some unary relational symbol αF . We define then MSO(L) as MSO over the language
{<, (αF )F∈F} where F denotes the set of (first-order) L#-formulas with at least one free
variable.
Definition 3.1. We say that A ⊆ (Σ∗)n is MSO(M)-definable if there exists an MSO(L)-
sentence ψ such that w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ A if and only if
(D,<D, (αF )F∈F ) |= ψ
where
• D = {0, 1, . . . , |〈w〉| − 1}, and <D is the natural ordering relation restricted to D;
• For every L#-formula F with n free variables, and every position x in w, the formula
αF (x) holds in (D,<D, (αF )F∈F ) if and only if
M# |= F (π1(〈w〉)[x], . . . , πn(〈w〉)[x]),
where πi(〈w〉) denotes the i−th component of 〈w〉.
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Example 3.2. Let M = (ω; +).
• the set A ⊆ ω∗ of words that contain only even symbols is MSO(M)-definable by the
sentence ∀y αF (y), where F (x) : ∃z(z + z = x)
• the set B ⊆ ω∗ of words whose symbols are alternatively even and odd is MSO(M)-
definable by the formula
∀x∀y((x < y ∧ ¬∃z x < z < y)→ ((αF (x)↔ α¬F (y))))
where F is the formula defined above.
Example 3.3. Let M = (Σ; (Pa)a∈Σ). If Σ is finite, then MSO(M)-definable languages
coincide with languages definable in Bu¨chi’s MSO logic. Indeed in this case it is rather easy
to prove that any formula F (x1, . . . , xn) in the language of M is equivalent to a boolean
combination of formulas of the form Pa(xi), which implies in turn that every predicate
αF (y) is equivalent to a boolean combination of predicates Qa(y).
We now generalize the equivalence between recognizability and definability to the case
of any alphabet Σ (finite or not).
Proposition 3.4. Let M be a structure with domain Σ. For every n ≥ 1 and every relation
R ⊆ (Σ∗)n, the relation R is MSO(M)-definable if and only if it is M-recognizable.
Proof. The proof is a simple adaptation from Bu¨chi’s equivalence between WMSO defin-
ability and recognizability [7]. For the direction from recognizability to definability one uses
the Bu¨chi’s technique of encoding of an accepting run of an automaton by a formula. For
the converse one uses the fact that the formulas αF1 , . . . , αFm appearing in an MSO(L)-
sentence ψ can be chosen such that every n−tuple of elements of the domain of M# satisfies
exactly one formula among the Fi’s in M#, which allows then to see words over Σ ∪ {#}
as words over the finite alphabet {1, . . . ,m} and then prove the result by induction on the
construction of ψ.
3.2. M-automatic structures and an extension of the EES formalism. Automatic
structures (see [15, 17, 2]) are relational structures which can be presented by finite automata
over a finite alphabet.
Definition 3.5. The structure N = (N ;R1, . . . , Rk) is said to be automatic if there exist
a finite alphabet Σ and an injective mapping µ : N → Σ∗ such that the images by µ of
N,R1, . . . , Rk are synchronous relations.
The fundamental result about automatic structures is the following.
Theorem 3.6 ([15]). If N is automatic then:
(1) the image by µ of every relation definable in N is a synchronous relation;
(2) FO(N) is decidable.
We can generalize the previous notions and results to the case of an infinite alphabet.
Definition 3.7. Let M = (Σ; . . . ) and N = (N ;R1, . . . , Rk) be two structures. We say that
N is M-automatic if there exists an injective mapping µ : N → Σ∗ such that the images by
µ of N,R1, . . . , Rk are M-recognizable relations.
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Example 3.8. Let M = (ω; +), and let N = (ω \ {0};×) where × denotes the graph of
multiplication. The structure N (which is often called Skolem arithmetic) is M-automatic.
Consider indeed the function µ : (ω \ {0}) → ω∗ which maps every natural number n > 1
whose prime decomposition is n = pn00 p
n1
1 . . . p
nk
k , where pi denotes the i−th prime and
nk 6= 0, to the word µ(n) = n0n1 . . . nk. Moreover let µ(1) = ε. It is not difficult to check
that the image by µ of ω \ {0} and × are M-recognizable.
One can prove rather easily that if Σ is finite and M = (Σ; (Pa)a∈Σ), then M-automatic
structures correspond to automatic structures. On the other hand, there exist structures
which areM-automatic but not automatic. For instance in [2] it is proven that the structure
N considered in the previous example, i.e. Skolem arithmetic, is not automatic1.
We can extend Theorem 3.6 in the following way.
Theorem 3.9. If N is M-automatic then:
(1) the image by µ of every relation definable in N is M-recognizable;
(2) FO(N) reduces to FO(M).
Proof. (sketch) This is a straightforward adaptation of the proof of Theorem 3.6. For (1)
one proceeds by induction on the formulas and use the closure properties of M-recognizable
relations as stated in Proposition 2.6. For (2), one first deduces from (1) that the decidability
of FO(N) reduces to the decidability of the emptiness problem for M-automata, and then
uses Proposition 2.7.
Let us now turn to the first-order characterization of M-recognizability. Eilenberg,
Elgot and Shepherdson prove the following result.
Theorem 3.10 ([13]). Let Σ denote a finite alphabet with at least two elements. For every
n ≥ 1, an n−ary relation over Σ is synchronous if and only if it is definable in the structure
S = (Σ∗;EqLength,, {La}a∈Σ)
where
• EqLength(x, y) holds if and only if x and y have the same length;
• x  y holds if and only if x is a prefix of y;
• La(x) holds if and only if a is the last letter of x.
It is easy to check that for every finite alphabet Σ the structure S is automatic, and
moreover one can deduce from the above theorem that every automatic structure is indeed
FO−interpretable in S (see e.g. [2]).
In [13], the authors asked whether there is an appropriate notion of automata that
captures this logic when Σ is infinite. Choffrut and Grigorieff [10] recently solved this
problem (and also other questions raised in [13]) by introducing a notion of automata with
constraints expressed as FO formulas. It appears that the automata notion they consider
captures exactly M-recognizable relations for the special case M = (Σ; (Pa)a∈Σ).
We can generalize the previous results in the following way.
Definition 3.11. Let M = (Σ;R1, . . . , Rk) be a structure. We define the stucture
SM = (Σ
∗;EqLength,, AR1 , . . . , ARk , A=)
1Note that Skolem arithmetic is tree-automatic in the sense of [2]. This comes from the fact that the
structureM, i.e. Presburger arithmetic, is automatic. More generally one can prove that ifM is an automatic
structure and N is M-automatic then N is tree-automatic.
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where
• EqLength(x, y) holds if and only if x and y have the same length;
• x  y holds if and only if x is a prefix of y;
• for every i, ARi(x1, . . . , xn) holds if and only if there exist words w1, . . . , wn ∈ Σ
∗ and
symbols a1, . . . , an ∈ Σ such that:
- xi = wiai for every i;
- all wi’s have the same length;
- (a1, . . . , an) ∈ R
M
i .
• A=(x, y) holds if and only if x and y have the same length and the same last letter.
Theorem 3.12. Let M = (Σ;R1, . . . , Rk) be a structure, where |Σ| ≥ 2.
(1) For every n ≥ 1 and every n−ary relation R over Σ, the relation R is M-recognizable
if and only if it is definable in SM;
(2) FO(SM) reduces to FO(M).
Proof.
(1) It is easy to check that all base relations of SM are M-recognizable, which implies
that SM is M-automatic, and thus by Theorem 3.9 every relation definable in SM is
M-recognizable.
For the converse one can adapt again Bu¨chi’s technique of encoding runs of automata
by monadic second-order variables. Assume that R ⊆ (Σ∗)n is recognized by some M-
automaton A = (Q,n,Σ,M, E, I, T ) whose set of states is Q = {q0, . . . , qk}. We can
define R in SM by a formula ϕ(w1, . . . , wn) which expresses the existence of a successful
path of A, say (qj0 , qj1 , . . . , qjm), labelled by 〈w1, . . . , wn〉. The formula encodes the
path with k+2 words z0, z1, . . . , zk, y whose length is m+1 (that is, |〈w1, . . . , wn〉|+1),
and such that for every i, the word zji is the only word among z0, z1, . . . , zk whose i−th
symbol equals the i−th symbol of y. That is, the variable y serves to identify zji for
every position i (with the help of the predicate A=).
(2) This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.9 together with the fact that SM is
M-automatic.
In Section 5 we will improve item (2) of the above theorem by proving that even the
monadic second-order chain logic of SM reduces to FO(M).
4. A special case of the Feferman-Vaught composition theorem
In this section we put in evidence the strong relationship between M-automata and a
special case of the Feferman-Vaught composition theorem. The Feferman-Vaught method
presented in [14] generalizes Mostowski’s work [23] about products of structures. Let us
recall some useful notions and results from [23, 14].
Definition 4.1. Let M = (Σ;RM1 , . . . , R
M
k ) be a structure, and let I be a non empty set.
The direct power of a M with respect to I is defined as the structure
N = (ΣI ;RN1 , . . . , R
N
k )
such that
• the domain of N is the set ΣI of sequences f : I → Σ
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• for every j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if Rj is n−ary then for every n−tuple (f1, . . . , fn) of elements of
ΣI , we have (f1, . . . , fn) ∈ R
N
j if and only if (f1(i), . . . , fn(i)) ∈ R
M
j for every i ∈ I.
Example 4.2. Let M = (ω; +), and I = ω. The direct power of M with respect to I is the
structure N with domain the set of sequences f : ω → ω (in other words, the set of ω−words
over the alphabet ω), and such that (f1, f2, f3) ∈ +
N if and only if f1(i) + f2(i) = f3(i) for
every i ∈ ω.
Mostowski proves that the evaluation of FO formulas in the direct power N reduces
to the evaluation of formulas in the factor structure M and formulas in the structure S =
(S(I);⊆) (the index structure) where S(I) denotes the power set of I, and ⊆ is interpreted
as the inclusion relation. Note that the FO theory of S is a variant of the MSO theory of
I.
Definition 4.3. Let R be an m−ary relation over elements of ΣI . A reduction sequence
for R (with respect to the structures M,S) is a sequence ξ = (G, θ1, . . . , θl) such that
• G is a formula in the language of S;
• θ1, . . . , θl are formulas in the language of M;
• for every m-tuple (f1, . . . , fm) of elements of Σ
I , we have (f1, . . . , fm) ∈ R if and only if
S |= G(T1, . . . , Tl)
where
Ti =
{
x ∈ I | M |= θi(f1(x), . . . , fm(x))} for every i ∈ {1, . . . , l
}
.
Example 4.2 (continued).
• The base relation +N of N admits a reduction sequence with respect to M = (ω; +) and
S = (S(ω);⊆). Indeed we have (f1, f2, f3) ∈ +
N if and only if the set of indexes i such
that f1(i) + f2(i) = f3(i) equals ω, that is if
S |= ∀Y Y ⊆ T
where
T = {i ∈ ω | M |= f1(i) + f2(i) = f3(i)}.
Thus +N admits the reduction sequence ξ = (G, θ1), where G(X) : ∀Y Y ⊆ X and
θ1(x, y, z) : x+ y = z.
More generally all base relations of a direct power of a structure M admit a reduction
sequence.
• Consider the formula
F (x) : ∀y1∀y2((∃z1 y1 + z1 = x ∧ ∃z2 y2 + z2 = x)→ ∃u(y1 + u = y2 ∨ y2 + u = y1))
We have N |= F (f) if and only if f admits at most one non-null element f(i), that is,
if the set of elements i such that f(i) + f(i) 6= f(i) contains at most one element. The
unary relation defined by F admits the reduction sequence ξ = (G, θ1) where
G(x) : ∀Y ∀Z((Y ⊆ X ∧ Z ⊆ X)→ (Y ⊆ Z ∨ Z ⊆ Y ))
and θ1(x) : x+ x 6= x.
Theorem 4.4 (Mostowski [23]). Let M be a structure, I be a non empty set, and let N be
the direct power of M with respect to I. Then
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(1) one can compute effectively a reduction sequence for every relation which is FO definable
in N;
(2) the FO theory of N reduces to the FO theories of M and S.
Mostowski also proves that FO(S) is decidable for every set I (by elimination of quan-
tifiers), which together with point (2) in the above theorem implies that for every I the FO
theory of the power of M with respect to I reduces to the FO theory of M.
Example 4.2 (continued). The FO theory of N is decidable, since it reduces to the FO
theory of (ω; +) which is decidable [25].
Another important notion is the one of weak direct power of a structure. In this variant
we consider a structure M = (Σ;RM1 , . . . , R
M
k , P
M
e ) with some distinguished element e ∈ Σ,
and where Pe(x) holds in M if and only if x = e. The weak power of M with respect to I
is defined in the same way as in Definition 4.1 but here the domain of N is the set M
(I)
e of
sequences f : I → Σ such that f(i) 6= e for finitely many values of i. Mostowski proves that
Theorem 4.4 still holds for weak direct powers, with the following modifications:
• for the index structure S one considers the structure Sfin = (S
+(I);⊆) where S+(I)
denotes the set of finite subsets of I.
• one considers only reduction sequences ξ = (G, θ1, . . . , θl) such that M |= ¬θi(e, . . . , e)
for every i (this condition ensures that all sets Ti in Definition 4.3 are finite).
Note that Sfin is a FO variant of the weak MSO theory of I. In [23] it is shown that
FO(Sfin) is decidable for every set I. Therefore FO(N) reduces to FO(M).
Example 4.5. (Decidability of Skolem arithmetic [23]) We revisit here Example 3.8. Con-
sider the structure M = (ω; +, P0) where 0 is the distinguished element, and I = ω. Then
the weak direct power of M with respect to I is the structure N = (ω
(ω)
0 ; +, P0) whose
domain is the set of sequences f : ω → ω such that f(i) 6= 0 for finitely many values of i, +
denotes the graph of addition of sequences f : ω → ω, and P0(f) holds only for f = 0. It
follows from Mostowski’s result that FO(N) is decidable since it reduces to FO(M) which
is decidable [25]. Now observe that the application h : ω
(ω)
0 → ω \ {0} which maps every
sequence f ∈ ω
(ω)
0 to the integer h(f) = 2
f(0)3f(1) . . . , defines an isomorphism between N
and the structure (ω \ {0};×, P1) where × denotes the graph of multiplication, and P1(x)
holds if and only if x = 1. Therefore the FO theory of the latter structure is decidable.
Feferman and Vaught [14] generalize Mostowski’s technique by allowing index structures
of the form S = (S(I);⊆, S1, . . . , Sm) where the Si’s denote any relations.
Definition 4.6. Let M = (Σ;RM1 , . . . , R
M
k ) be a structure, I be a set, and let S = (S(I);⊆
, S1, . . . , Sm) where the Si’s denote relations. We call generalized power
2 of M with respect
to S every structure of the form
N = (ΣI ;P1, P2, . . . , Pn)
such that all relations Pi admit a reduction sequence with respect to M and S.
Theorem 4.7 (Feferman-Vaught [14]). If N is a generalized power of M with respect to S,
then Theorem 4.4 holds for M,N and S.
2Our definition is a slight modification of the original definition. Indeed Feferman and Vaught define
the generalized power of M with respect to S as the structure with domain ΣI and with infinitely many
relations Pi, one for each relation which admits a reduction sequence.
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Example 4.8. Let I = ω, and let S be the structure Sω = (S(ω);⊆,≪) where x ≪ y if
and only if x and y are two singleton sets, say x = {m} and y = {n}, such that m < n. This
structure is a FO version of the MSO theory of (ω;<), which was shown to be decidable
by Bu¨chi [8]. Let M = (ω; +). Consider the structure N = (ωI ;P1) where P1(f) holds in
N if and only if there exist j ∈ ω such that f(i) = 0 for every i > j. The structure N is a
generalized power of M with respect to S. Indeed it is easy to check that P1(f) holds in N
if and only if
S |= ∃X1∀X2(X1 ≪ X2 → X2 ⊆ T )
where
T = {i ∈ ω | M |= f(i) + f(i) = f(i)}.
By Theorem 4.7, the FO theory of N is decidable, since the FO theories of M and Sω are
decidable by [25, 8].
Feferman and Vaught also define the notion of generalized weak power of a structure
M = (Σ;RM1 , . . . , R
M
k , P
M
e ) with respect to some index structure S. This notion generalizes
the one of weak power by allowing to deal with index structures of the form S = (S+(I);⊆
, S1, . . . , Sn) where the Si’s denote relations over S
+(I). Feferman and Vaught prove that
Theorem 4.4 still holds for generalized weak powers, with the same modifications as for
direct weak powers.
Let us consider the case where S is the structure S<ω = (S
+(ω);⊆,≪). The FO
theory of S<ω is a variant of the weak MSO theory of (ω;<). In this case there is a close
correspondence between relations which admit a reduction sequence with respect to S, and
MSO(M)-definable relations, or equivalently M-recognizable relations (by Theorem 3.4).
Consider indeed an alphabet Σ, and the application µ which maps every finite word
w over Σ to the ω−word µ(w) = w#ω over (Σ ∪ {#})ω . The word µ(w) can be seen
as an element of (Σ ∪ {#})
(ω)
# . Given an n−ary relation R over Σ
∗, we set µ(R) =
{(µ(w1), . . . , µ(wn))|(w1, . . . , wn) ∈ R}. The relation µ(R) can be seen as a subset of the
set of sequences f : ω → ω ∪ {#} such that f(i) 6= # for finitely many values of i, i.e. as a
subset of (Σ ∪ {#})
(ω)
# .
Proposition 4.9. Let M = (Σ; . . . ) be a structure. For every n ≥ 1 and every n−ary
relation R over Σ∗, the relation R is MSO(M)-definable if and only if the relation µ(R)
admits a reduction sequence with respect to M# and S<ω.
We shall illustrate this proposition by some example, and leave the proof to the reader.
Example 3.2 revisited. Let M = (ω; +), and let R denote the set of words w over ω that
contain only even symbols. The relation R isMSO(M)-definable by the sentence ∀y αF (y),
where F (x) : ∃z(z + z = x).
In this case µ(R) corresponds to the set of sequences f ∈ (ω ∪ {#})
(ω)
# such that
• the set of indexes i such that f(i) 6= # is an initial segment of ω;
• for every i such that f(i) 6= #, f(i) is even.
This implies that µ(R) admits a reduction sequence with respect to M# and S<ω. Indeed
we have f ∈ µ(A) if and only if
S<ω |= ∀X∀Y ((Y ⊆ T ∧X ≪ Y )→ X ⊆ T ) ∧ ∀Y (Y ⊆ T → Y ⊆ T
′)
where
T = {i ∈ ω | M# |= f(i) 6= #}
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and
T ′ = {i ∈ ω | M# |= ∃z(z + z = f(i))}
The second part of the above formula is a direct translation of the MSO sentence ∀y αF (y)
used to prove the MSO(M)-definability of R. It is not difficult to prove that a similar
translation is possible for every MSO(M)-definable relation.
Recall that by Proposition 3.4, MSO(M)-definability and M-recognizability are equiv-
alent. Proposition 4.9 allows to revisit our previous results in terms of powers of structures:
• The closure of M-recognizable relations under boolean operations, projection and cylin-
drification (Proposition 2.6), could have been proven as a consequence of Proposition 4.9
together with the closure under definability of relations which admit a reduction sequence.
• If N = (N ;R1, . . . , Rn) is an M-automatic structure then by Proposition 3.4 and 4.9 the
image by µ of the domain and base relations of N admit a reduction sequence with respect
to M# and S<ω. Thus every M-automatic structure is isomorphic to some relativized
generalized weak power of M# with respect to S<ω. Moreover by Feferman-Vaught
Theorem, FO(N) reduces to FO(M#) and FO(S<ω). Now one can reduce FO(M#) to
FO(M), and FO(S<ω) is decidable by [7]. Finally this proves that FO(N) reduces to
FO(M), that is, Theorem 3.9.
• In the same way as M-automata over finite words correspond to generalized weak powers
with respect to the index structure S<ω, one can define a notion of M-automata over
ω−words and show that it corresponds to generalized powers with respect to the index
structure Sω.
5. Applications
5.1. An application to monadic chain logic over iteration. We apply the previous
results to improve a recent result of Kuske and Lohrey [19]. This application was brought
to our attention by Wolfgang Thomas.
In [19] the authors consider decidability issues related to monadic second-order chain
logic, and applications to pushdown systems. Given a structure A = (A;<, . . . ) where
< denotes a partial ordering, the monadic second-order chain logic of A, which will be
denoted by MSOch(A), is the fragment of the MSO theory of A where monadic second
order quantifications are restricted to chains (i.e. linearly ordered subsets) with respect to
<. The logic MSOch was first investigated in [30].
Consider a L-structure M = (Σ;R1, . . . , Rm). The basic iteration of M is the structure
M
∗
ba = (Σ
∗;, AˆR1 , . . . , AˆRm)
where, for every relational symbol Rj with arity n,
AˆRj = {(ua1, . . . , uan) | u ∈ Σ
∗, (a1, . . . , an) ∈ R
M
j }
Kuske and Lohrey prove the following result.
Theorem 5.1. [19, Theorem 4.10] For every structure M, theMSOch theory of M∗ba reduces
to the FO theory of M.
We can improve this result by replacing the structureM∗ba with the structure SM which
we introduced in Section 3.2.
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Theorem 5.2. For every structure M = (Σ;R1, . . . , Rm), the MSO
ch theory of SM =
(Σ∗;EqLength,, AR1 , . . . , ARm , A=) reduces to the FO theory of M.
Observe that all predicates AˆRi can be defined in SM.
Proof. The proof consists in two main steps. The first one is to reduce theMSOch theory of
SM to the FO theory of some structure S
′
M
with domain Σω. The technique is an adaptation
from [31, Section 4]. The second step consists in proving that S ′
M
is a generalized power
with respect to M and Sω, which allows then to use Feferman-Vaught Theorem and the
decidability of FO(Sω) to conclude.
We first consider a variant of MSOch of SM where only second-order variables occur;
this can be done by introducing the inclusion predicate X1 ⊆ X2, and replacing relations
between elements by the corresponding relations between singleton sets.
Now every chain X of elements of Σ∗ can be represented by a couple (u, v) of elements
of Σω in the following way:
• u corresponds to the “direction” of the chain X, i.e. is such that all elements of X are
prefixes of u (note that if X is infinite then there exists a unique such u);
• v indicates which prefixes of u belong to X, in the following way: for every integer i, we
have v[i] = u[i] if and only if the prefix of u of length i belongs to X.
According to this definition, any couple (u, v) of elements of Σω represents a single chain
which will be denoted by ch(u, v).
The previous encoding allows to reduce the MSOch theory of SM to the FO theory of
the structure:
S ′
M
= (Σω;≈,⊆′, EqLength′,′, A′R1 , . . . , A
′
Rn
)
where
• ≈ (u1, v1, u2, v2) holds if and only if ch(u1, v1) = ch(u2, v2);
• ⊆′ (u1, v1, u2, v2) holds if and only if ch(u1, v1) ⊆ ch(u2, v2);
• EqLength′(u1, v1, u2, v2) holds if and only if there exist two words u, u
′ ∈ Σ∗ such that
ch(u1, v1) = {u}, ch(u2, v2) = {u
′}, and SM |= EqLength(u, u
′) ;
• ′ (u1, v1, u2, v2) holds if and only if there exist two words u, u
′ ∈ Σ∗ such that ch(u1, v1) =
{u}, ch(u2, v2) = {u
′}, and SM |= u  u
′;
• For every i, if Ri is a n−ary relation, then A
′
Ri
(u1, v1, u2, v2, . . . , un, vn) holds if and
only if there exist words w1, . . . , wn ∈ Σ
∗ such that ch(uj , vj) = {wj} for every j, and
SM |= ARi(w1, . . . , wn).
• A′=(u1, v1, u2, v2) holds if and only if there exist two words u, u
′ ∈ Σ∗ such that ch(u1, v1) =
{u}, ch(u2, v2) = {u
′}, and SM |= A=(u, u
′);
We shall prove that S ′
M
is a generalized power of M with respect to Sω. To this aim,
let us prove that all base relations of S ′
M
admit a reduction sequence with respect to M
and Sω:
• ⊆′ (u1, v1, u2, v2) holds if and only if
Sω |= T1 ⊆ T2 ∧ ∃X(IS(X,T3) ∧ T1 ⊆ X)
where
T1 = {i ∈ ω | u1(i) = v1(i)},
T2 = {i ∈ ω | u2(i) = v2(i)},
T3 = {i ∈ ω | u1(i) = u2(i)},
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and IS(X,T3) is a formula which expresses that X is the greatest initial segment of ω
which is contained in T3 (this is expressible in Sω);
• ≈ (u1, v1, u2, v2) holds if and only if both ⊆
′ (u1, v1, u2, v2) and ⊆
′ (u2, v2, u1, v1) hold,
from which we can deduce a reduction sequence for the relation ≈;
• EqLength′(u1, v1, u2, v2) holds if and only if T1 and T2 are singleton sets and T1 = T2,
i.e. if
Sω |= ∃Y (T1 ≪ Y ) ∧ T1 = T2
(with the same notations as above);
• ′ (u1, v1, u2, v2) holds if and only if
Sω |= ∃Y (T1 ≪ Y ) ∧ (T1 = T2 ∨ T1 ≪ T2) ∧ ∃X(IS(X,T3) ∧ T1 ⊆ X);
• for every i, if Ri is a n−ary relation, then A
′
Ri
(u1, v1, u2, v2, . . . , un, vn) holds if and only
if all sets Uj = {i ∈ ω | uj(i) = vj(i)}, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, are singleton sets and are equal,
and are included in the set
U = {i ∈ ω | M |= Rj(u1(i), u2(i), . . . , un(i))}.
These properties can be expressed in Sω.
• the case of A′=(u1, v1, u2, v2) is similar to the previous case, with n = 2 and = in place of
Rj ;
We have proved that S ′
M
is a generalized power of M with respect to Sω. By Theorem
4.7, FO(S ′
M
) reduces to the FO theories of M and Sω. Now FO(Sω) is decidable by Bu¨chi
[8], thus FO(S ′
M
) reduces to FO(M).
5.2. Ordinal addition and (ω; +)-recognizability. We shall focus now on the case M =
(ω; +), where + denotes the graph of addition. In this case we present another logical
characterization of M-recognizable relations in terms of ordinal theories. This is essentially
a reformulation of known results.
In the sequel we consider structures of the form (α; +) where α is an ordinal. The
domain is the set of ordinals less than α, and + is interpreted as the graph of ordinal
addition restricted to the domain.
Feferman and Vaught prove in [14] that for every ordinal γ the structure (ωγ ; +) is
isomorphic to some generalized weak power of (ω; +) with respect to (S+(γ);⊆,≪)3.
In particular for γ = ω their result, combined with Bu¨chi’s result, implies that via some
encoding all relations definable in (ωω; +) are (ω; +)-recognizable, and that the theory of
(ωω; +) is decidable.
Let us be more specific. We first recall some useful results on ordinal arithmetic; all of
them can be found e.g. in Sierpinski’s book [29, chap.XIV]
Proposition 5.3 (Cantor normal form for ordinals). Every ordinal α > 0 can be written
uniquely as
α = ωα1a1 + · · · + ω
αkak
where α1, α2, . . . , αk is a decreasing sequence of ordinals, and 0 < ai < ω.
3As a corollary, the FO theory of (ωγ ; +) reduces to the FO theory of (ω; +) (Presburger Arithmetic,
which is decidable [25]) and the weak MSO theory of (γ,<). The latter was proved to be decidable by Bu¨chi
[9] a few years after Feferman-Vaught’ work, which implies the decidability of the FO theory of (ωγ ; +).
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The following proposition relates the Cantor normal form of the ordinal α + β to the
one of α and β.
Proposition 5.4. Let α = ωα1a1+ · · ·+ω
αkak and β = ω
β1b1+ · · ·+ω
βlbl be two ordinals
> 0 in Cantor normal form.
• If α1 < β1 then α+ β = β
• If α1 ≥ β1 and if αj = β1 for some j, then
α+ β = (ωα1a1 + · · ·+ ω
αj−1aj−1) + ω
αj (aj + b1) + (ω
β2b2 + · · ·+ ω
βlbl)
• If α1 ≥ β1 and if αj 6= β1 for every j, then
α+ β = (ωα1a1 + · · ·+ ω
αmam) + (ω
β1b1 + · · · + ω
βlbl)
where m is the greatest index for which αm > β1.
Consider now the function f : ωω → ω∗ which maps every ordinal α < ωω, written
in Cantor normal form as α =
∑i=0
i=m ω
iai with ai < ω and am 6= 0, to the word c(α) =
a0 . . . am over the alphabet ω. Given n ordinals α1, . . . , αn, we define c(α1, . . . , αn) as
〈c(α1), . . . , c(αn)〉, where we choose 0 as the padding symbol #.
Example 5.5. Consider the ordinals
α = ω6 · 5 + ω4 · 4 + ω3 · 3 + ω1 · 2 + ω0 · 11,
and
β = ω3 · 17 + ω2 · 6 + ω1 · 2.
Then by Proposition 5.4 (second case), the ordinal γ = α+ β equals
γ = (ω6 · 5 + ω4 · 4) + ω3 · (3 + 17) + (ω2 · 6 + ω1 · 2).
We have
c(α, β, γ) =

 110
0



 22
2



 06
6



 317
20



 40
4



 00
0



 50
5

 .
Proposition 5.4 is the key argument in Feferman-Vaught’ proof that (ωγ ; +) is iso-
morphic to some generalized weak power of (ω; +) with respect to (S+(γ);⊆,≪). Let us
reformulate their ideas in terms of (ω; +)-automata.
Proposition 5.6. The image by c of the graph of addition for ordinals < ωω is (ω; +)-
recognizable.
Proof. A convenient (ω; +)-automaton which recognizes the language
X = {c(α, β, γ) | α, β, γ < ωω, α+ β = γ}
is pictured in Figure 2, where
• ϕ1(x, y, z) : z = y
• ϕ2(x, y, z) : y 6= 0 ∧ z = x+ y
• ϕ3(x, y, z) : y = 0 ∧ z = x
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q0 q1
ϕ1
ϕ2
ϕ3
Figure 2: An (ω; +)-automaton for ordinal addition
This automaton has two states q0, q1. Both are initial states, and only q1 is final. Using
q1 as the initial state allows to deal with the case β = 0; in this case we have γ = α, which
is checked by the transition labelled by ϕ3.
Using q0 as an initial state allows to deal with the case β 6= 0. In this case let ω
β1 denote
the greatest power of ω which appears in the Cantor normal form of β. The transition
labelled by ϕ1 allows to deal with coefficients of powers ω
i where i < β1; for these powers
the corresponding coefficients of β and α+ β must be equal. The transition labelled by ϕ2
corresponds to the power ωβ1 . Then for all powers ωj such that j > β1, the corresponding
coefficients of α and α+ β coincide; this corresponds to the transition labelled by ϕ3.
We can provide now a characterization of M-recognizable relations for the case M =
(ω; +).
Proposition 5.7. For every n ≥ 1, and every n−ary relation R over ωω, the relation R is
definable in (ωω; +) if and only if c(R) is (ω; +)-recognizable.
Proof. (sketch) The “only if” part comes from the fact that the range of c, as well as the
graph of ordinal addition, are (ω; +)-recognizable. Thus (ωω; +) is (ω; +)-automatic, and
the result follows from Theorem 3.9.
For the converse one can use again Bu¨chi’s encoding technique as in Theorem 3.12.
Assume that c(R) is (ω; +)-recognizable by some (ω; +)-automaton A whose set of states is
Q = {q0, q1, . . . , qm}. We can defineR in (ω
ω; +) by a formula ϕ(α1, . . . , αn) which expresses
the existence of a successful path of A, say (qj0 , qj2 , . . . , qjm), labelled by c(α1, . . . , αn). The
formula encodes the path with an ordinal of the form γ = ωmjm + ω
m−1jm−1 + · · ·+ ω
0j0.
We need to define the following auxiliary predicates (we explain briefly how to define
them in (ωω; +)):
• α < β (we have α < β if and only if there exists some non-null ordinal γ such that
β = α+ γ);
• the function (x1, . . . , xn) 7→ max(x1, . . . , xn);
• “to be a limit ordinal less than ωω” (these are non-null ordinals which have no predecessor
with respect to <);
• Pow(x) which holds iff x is a power of ω less than ωω (which holds iff x is a limit ordinal
and there do not exist limit ordinals β, γ such that x = β + γ and γ ≤ β);
• For every i < ω, the relation Multi(x) which holds iff x an ordinal of the form ω
k · i
(easily definable with the predicate Pow(x));
• the function x 7→ xω (for x 6= 0, the ordinal xω is the least power of ω greater than x);
• App(x, y) which holds iff y is a power of ω which appears in the Cantor normal form of x
(this holds if and only if Pow(y) holds and moreover there exist ordinals β1, β2 such that
x = β1 + y + β2 and β2 < y);
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• AddCoef(x, y, z) which holds if and only if there exist i, j, k ≤ ω such that x = ωki,
y = ωkj and z = ωk(i+ j) – which is equivalent to saying that z = x+ y and there exists
exactly one ordinal α such that App(x, α) ∧App(y, α) ∧App(z, α) holds.
• Term(x, y, z) which holds iff z is a power of ω, say z = ωk, y = ωki for some i < ω,
and y is the term which corresponds to ωk in the Cantor normal form of x. The relation
Term(x, y, z) holds if and only if Pow(z) holds, z is the only power of ω which appears
in the Cantor normal form of y, and there exist ordinals β1, β2 such that x = β1 + y+ β2
with β2 < y, and z do not appear in the Cantor normal forms of β1 and β2.
• For every formula ψ(x1, . . . , xn) in the language {+,=} one can define the predicate
Sψ(y1, . . . , yn, z) which holds if and only if z is a power of ω, say z = ω
k, and if we denote
by a1, . . . , an the coefficients of ω
k in the Cantor normal forms of y1, . . . , yn, respectively,
then (ω; +) |= ψ(a1, . . . , an). The predicates Sψ can be defined from Term and AddCoef
by induction on the construction of ψ.
• Codi(x, y) expresses that y is a power of ω and the coefficient of y in the Cantor normal
form of x equals i. This predicate is easily definable from the predicatesMulti and Term.
Finally we can define the formula ϕ(α1, . . . , αn) as
∃γ
(
γ < max(α1, . . . , αn) · ω (5.1)
∧
∨
qi∈I
Codi(γ, ω
0) (5.2)
∧
(
∀β((Pow(β) ∧ β ≤ max(α1, . . . , αn) · ω) −→ (5.3)∨
(qi,ψ,qj)∈E
(Codi(γ, β) ∧ Sψ(α1, . . . , αn, β) ∧Codj(γ, βω))
)
(5.4)
∧
∨
qi∈T
Codi(γ,max(α1, . . . , αn) · ω)
)
(5.5)
Line 5.2 states that the first state of the sequence of states encoded by γ is an initial state;
lines 5.3 and 5.4 that consecutive states in the sequence use transitions of the automaton,
and line 5.5 that the last state of the sequence is terminal.
Remarks 5.8.
• One can prove that the graph of x 7→ ωx is not M-recognizable, either in a direct way, or
using the fact that by [11] the theory of (ωω; +, x 7→ ωx) is undecidable, while the theory
of (ωω; +, x 7→ xω) is decidable since the function x 7→ xω is definable in (ωω; +) which
has a decidable theory.
• We could reformulate the above results by replacing (ωω; +) by the structure (ω;×, <P ),
where x <P y holds if and only if x < y and x, y are prime numbers. In this case we encode
every word u = a0 . . . an over the alphabet ω by the integer c
′(u) = 2a0+13a1+1 . . . pan+1n
where pn denotes the n−th prime number. We refer to [22] for details about the link
between (ωω; +) and (ω;×, <P ).
FEFERMAN-VAUGHT THEOREM, AUTOMATA AND LOGIC 19
6. An extension of the Feferman-Vaught formalism
The automata and logic that we introduced in the previous sections do not allow com-
parisons between symbols from different positions. For instance, for every structure M
whose domain is infinite, the language {ss | s ∈ |M |} is not MSO(M)-definable (see Ex-
ample 2.5). More generally, given any formula ϕ(x, y) in the language of M, the language
{s1s2 | M# |= ϕ(s1, s2)} is not in general MSO(M)-definable.
A natural way to add expressive power is to extend MSO with predicates such as
P (x, y) interpreted as “x, y are two positions in w such that w[x] = w[y]”, or more generally
predicates interpreted as “x, y are two positions in w such that M# |= ϕ(w[x], w[y])” (where
ϕ is some L#-formula).
However these extensions do not add expressive power when M is finite, and lead to
undecidable theories in case M has an infinite domain (we refer the reader e.g. to [3] where
it is shown that much weaker related formalisms have undecidable FO theories).
Thus in order to get decidability results we have to restrict the use of these new pred-
icates. Below we describe a syntactic fragment for which the satisfiability problem still
reduces to the decidability of the first-order theory of M.
Given an L-structure M = (Σ; . . . ), we associate to every L#−formula F with m free
variables some (new) m−ary relational symbol θF .
Definition 6.1. We define MSO+(L) as MSO over the language {<, (θF )F∈F} where F
denotes the set of L#−formulas with at least one free variable.
The interpretation of MSO+(L) sentences is similar to MSO(L), but for every L#-
formula F with m free variables the interpretation of θF (x1, . . . , xm) is “the positions
x1, . . . , xm in the word w satisfy M# |= F (w[x1], . . . , w[xm])”.
Definition 6.2. We say that X ⊆ Σ∗ is MSO+(M)-definable if there exists an MSO+(L)-
sentence ϕ which defines X. The definition can be extended easily to the case of subsets
X ⊆ (Σ∗)n.
Note that if one allows only MSO+(L) sentences where the predicates θF are unary,
we get nothing but MSO(L).
Example 6.3. Let M = (ω; +).
• The language X ⊆ ω∗ of words u over ω such that some symbol s ∈ Σ appears at least
twice in u is MSO+(M)-definable by the MSO+(L)-sentence
∃x∃y(x < y ∧ θF (x, y))
where
F (x1, x2) : x1 = x2.
• The language X ′ ⊆ ω∗ of words over ω of the form u = s0 . . . sm such that there exists
j ∈ {0, . . . ,m} such that sk ≥ 2sj whenever k > j, is MSO
+(M)-definable by the
MSO+(L)-sentence
∃x(∃x′(x < x′) ∧ ∀y(x < y → θG(x, y))
where
G(x1, x2) : ∃z(x2 = x1 + x1 + z)
denotes the formula which expresses that x2 ≥ 2x1.
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Example 6.4. Let M = (Σ∗;EqLength,, {La}a∈Σ) denote the EES structure S (see
Section 3.2). The set of words w = s0 . . . sm over the infinite alphabet Γ = Σ
∗ such that
all even positions carry the same symbol, and all odd positions carry a symbol which is a
prefix of s0, is MSO
+(M)-definable. Indeed a convenient MSO+(L)-sentence is
∃X[EvenPositions(X)∧
∧∃x ∈ X ∀y ∈ X θF1(x, y) ∧ ∃z(∀t ¬t < z ∧ ∀y 6∈ X θF2(y, z))]
where EvenPositions(X) is an MSO-formula which expresses that X consists in the set
of even positions of w, and
F1(v1, v2) : v1 = v2 ;
F2(v1, v2) : v1  v2.
The formalism MSO+(L) is in general too expressive with respect to decidability, thus
we have to consider a syntactic fragment of it.
Definition 6.5. We define MSO+R(L) as the syntactic fragment of MSO
+(L) consisting
in formulas of the form
∃x1 . . . ∃xn ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)
where ϕ is an MSO+(L)-formula which satisfies the following constraint, which we denote
by (∗): all predicates of the form θF in ϕ have the form θF (x1, . . . , xn, y), i.e. contain at
most one free variable distinct from the x′is.
Note that formulas considered in Examples 6.3 and 6.4 are MSO+R(L)-formulas.
Theorem 6.6. The emptiness problem for MSO+R(M)-definable languages reduces to the
decidability of the FO theory of M.
Proof. Let Σ be the domain of M. To each MSO+R(L)-sentence ψ of the form
∃x1 . . . ∃xn ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)
where ϕ satisfies (∗) we associate in an effective way an MSO(L′)-formula ψ′ where L′
is obtained by adding to L new constant symbols c1, . . . , cn, in order that for every L-
structure M, the sentence ψ is satisfiable by some word over Σ if and only if there exists
some L′−expansion M′ of M such that the the set of words over Σ defined by ψ′ is not
empty.
The transformation proceeds as follows. First, we can assume that all formulas of the
form θF (x1, . . . , xn, y) which appear in ϕ are such that y appears freely in θF : indeed if y
does not appear in θF then θF (x1, . . . , xn) is equivalent to ∃y(y = xn ∧ θF ′(x1, . . . , xn−1, y))
where F ′ is obtained from F by substituting y for xn.
We define the MSO(L′)-formula ψ′ as
∃x1 . . . ∃xn (
n∧
i=1
αFi(xi) ∧ ϕ
′(x1, . . . , xn))
where Fi(y) denotes the formula y = ci and ϕ
′ is obtained from ϕ by replacing every
formula θF (x1, . . . , xn, y) by the formula αF ′(y) where F
′ is obtained from F by replacing
every occurence of xi by the constant symbol ci.
It is easy to check that for every L-structure M, ψ is satisfiable by some word model
over Σ if and only if there exists some L′−expansion M′ of M such that L(ψ′) 6= ∅.
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The formula ψ′ involves the predicates αF1 , . . . , αFn , and also predicates of the form αF
which appear in ϕ′, say αFn+1 , . . . , αFp . By Proposition 3.4, givenM
′ the question of whether
the language defined by ψ′ is empty reduces to decide emptiness for the corresponding
M
′−automaton. This amounts to compute the set EM′ of subsets I ⊆ {1, . . . , p} such that
there exists a ∈ Σ such that (M′ |= Fi(a) if and only if i ∈ I). Thus it suffices to compute
all possible sets EM′ for all L
′−expansions M′ of M. This can be done effectively since for
every subset E of subsets of {1, . . . , p}, one can find an L-sentence HE such that M |= HE
if and only if there exists some L′−expansion M′ of M such that EM′ = E. Therefore we
reduced our initial problem to the question of whether M satisfies some sentence.
7. Discussion and conclusion
The proof of Theorem 6.6 makes uses of Bu¨chi’s decidability result for the WMSO
theory of (ω;<). However the arguments are sufficiently general to apply to any decidable
extension of WMSO. An interesting example is the WMSO theory Tcard of ω, without
<, but with the predicate X ∼ Y interpreted as “X and Y have the same cardinality”.
This theory was proven to be decidable by Feferman and Vaught in [14] by reduction to
Presburger Arithmetic (by elimination of quantifiers, and without using the composition
technique). For recent applications of this decidability result we refer the reader to the
papers [18, 28, 20].
One can show that Theorem 6.6 holds with Tcard, which provides a class of the-
ories which are both decidable and quite expressive. As an example, if we set M =
(Σ∗;EqLength,, {La}a∈Σ) (the EES structure, whose FO theory is decidable [13]), then
the corresponding syntactic fragment allows to express properties related to finite words
w over the alphabet Σ′ = Σ∗ (that is, finite sequences of words over Σ) such as “there
exist two distinct symbols s, s′ appearing in w such that at least one third of the symbols
in w are prefix of s, or have the same length as s′”. Another interesting example is the
case M = (ω; +). In this case we obtain a decidable fragment for words over the alphabet
ω, i.e. lists of natural numbers. This fragment might be an interesting formalism for the
verification of programs which manipulate pointers and linked data structures.
By Proposition 3.4, M-automata capture the logic MSO(L). Thus a natural issue is to
get an automata counterpart for the logic MSO+R(L). An idea is to consider M-automata
equipped with a finite number of “write once” registers. In addition to the usual transitions
of M-automata, these automata are allowed to write the current symbol in some empty
register, and test whether the symbols currently stored in the registers and the current
symbol satisfy some L#−sentence in M#. Once a symbol is stored in some register, the
automaton cannot store any other symbol in this register. In order to capture the fragment
MSO+R(L), it seems that one should also allow non-deterministic ǫ−transitions where the
automaton chooses to store some symbol from the input alphabet in some (empty) register.
Another interesting issue would be to find (more natural) extensions of the Feferman-
Vaught formalism in the spirit of Theorem 6.6. The formalism MSO+(L) allows the use
of predicates θF for all L#−formulas F , which makes necessary to consider the fragment
MSO+R(L) in order to get decidability results. It would be interesting to find other fragments
of MSO+(L) obtained by imposing conditions on the L#−formulas F . One can consider
e.g the case where we allow only the use of formulas F which define equivalence relations
in M. Note that similar results are already proven in the papers [3, 4].
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Finally, it seems that all results in this paper can be extended rather easily to the case
of infinite words as well as (in)finite binary trees, by relying on classical decidability results
for MSO theories.
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